

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD PACIFIC AREA



Strategic Intent

Fiscal Years 2015-2019

Updated January 2016



PACIFIC AREA

The United States is a Pacific nation. The Pacific is vital to U.S. security, economic, and cultural interests. The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Pacific Area (PACAREA), based in Alameda, California, is one of two geographic operating commands of the USCG. PACAREA's Area of Responsibility (AOR) extends from Montana to Madagascar and from the North to South Poles. Below are select indicators that illustrate the dynamic conditions, value to the Nation, and nexus with the USCG's missions of maritime safety, security, and stewardship in the PACAREA AOR.

Geography

4.2

Billions of people in PACAREA
(61% of world's population)

6 of 7

Continents in PACAREA

40

Percent decline of Polar Ice Cap
since 1979

50

Percent of people living within
100 kilometers of coast

71

Countries in PACAREA

74

Millions of square miles in PACAREA

Economy

7 of 15

Top U.S. trading partners
in PACAREA

30

Percent of U.S. shipments transiting the
Ports of Los Angeles & Long Beach

80

Percent of U.S. Exclusive Economic
Zones in PACAREA

95

Percent of U.S. commerce
transits by sea

50

Billions of dollars seafood industry in
PACAREA adds to U.S. economy per year

698

Billions of dollars of U.S. goods exports
to Asia-Pacific in 2013

Security & Safety

4

DOD campaign plans with PACAREA role

5

U.S. security agreements in PACAREA

6 of 9

Global nuclear weapons states

145

Millions of people affected per year by
disasters (\$70 billion damages)

118

Percent increase in maritime transit in
Bering Strait from 2008 to 2012

400

Tons of U.S. demand for cocaine
annually

UPDATE NOTE

Since the *Strategic Intent* was first published in 2014, PACAREA has faced a number of significant incidents and events that serve to remind us of the ever-present and growing risks in PACAREA's AOR that impact our Nation's security and prosperity to include:

- Western Hemisphere Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) networks generating instability, violence, and corruption that erodes the rule of law and economic growth, the symptoms of which the United States sees when children and families flock to our borders;
- Arctic maritime activity increasing in newly-navigable waters, particularly energy exploration and commercial vessel transits;
- Cyber attacks against U.S. Government (USG) agencies impacting over 20 million U.S. citizens, as well as attacks against U.S. corporations and industry;
- South China Sea maritime territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) claims, reclamation, and contestation;
- California's Refugio State Beach oil spill of 100,000 gallons from a pipeline leak and 20,000 gallons reaching the ocean; and,
- U.S. Marine Transportation System (MTS) disruptions and delays during contract negotiations between International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) and Pacific Maritime Association (PMA) for U.S. West Coast ports.

We have also seen extensive promulgation of strategy, doctrine, and policy initiatives at the national, departmental, and Service levels, which build on and complement existing strategies, such as the USCG Arctic Strategy 2013, to include:

- National Security Strategy 2015
- National Drug Control Strategy 2015
- U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America 2015
- U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Quadrennial Defense Review 2014
- A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower 2015
- National Military Strategy 2015
- U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) 2014
- DHS Unity of Effort Memo 2014
- DHS Southern Border and Approaches (SBA) Campaign Plan 2015
- DHS SBA Strategic Guidance 2014
- USCG Commandant's Direction 2014
- USCG Commandant's Strategic Intent 2015
- USCG Cyber Strategy 2015
- USCG Human Capital Strategy 2016
- USCG Publication 1 - Doctrine for the U.S. Coast Guard 2014
- USCG Western Hemisphere Strategy 2014

Select portions of the *Strategic Intent* were refreshed to fulfill its original intent to serve as a living document that reflects developments in PACAREA's AOR. Much of the structure and areas of emphasis remain the same, given the enduring nature of the risks facing PACAREA's AOR. Unity of effort and partnerships, as well as the importance of intelligence and proficiency, continue to be critical enablers of PACAREA operations, as adversaries adapt to USCG tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), requiring innovation, new technological solutions, and additional resourcing to achieve operational advantage and intended endgame.

INTRODUCTION

PACAREA is responsible for providing strategic and operational guidance to ensure effective tactical execution of USCG operations throughout the Pacific theater. These tactical operations are typically executed at the district and sector levels, while PACAREA’s role is that of a “force provider” or supporting commander. The forces permanently assigned to PACAREA are identified in Figure 1.

This *Strategic Intent* serves to assess enduring and emerging threats across the vast Pacific region and outline external factors that will contribute to mission requirements and create an increasingly competitive demand for resource capacity over the next five years. This five-year cycle coincides with the USCG’s overarching fiscal and strategic planning guidance. The *Strategic Intent* shall be updated periodically to accommodate any threat-driven changes to PACAREA’s mission requirements, as well as changes to our resource operating base. Finally, this *Strategic Intent* is not an implementation plan per se, but shall serve as a deliberation tool in guiding the allocation of resources and continual validation of capabilities and capacities available to meet mission requirements that are focused upon maritime safety, security, and stewardship.

PACAREA is dual-purposed as Defense Force West, and in this capacity, executes Maritime Homeland Defense (MHD) operations under Title 10 U.S. Code (USC), either independently or as a supporting element to the DOD in accordance with the *Memorandum of Agreement between the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security for Inclusion of the U.S. Coast Guard in Support of Maritime Homeland Defense* that was signed in 2004. [There is a reciprocal Agreement where the U.S. Navy (USN) supports the USCG in maritime homeland security operations that was signed in 2006.]

Tactical operations are conducted in three discrete zones: the *offshore zone* that begins 50 nautical miles from shore and extends seaward across our EEZ and at times into the territorial seas of foreign nations; the *coastal zone* that begins at the shoreline and extends seaward to 50 nautical miles; and, the *inshore zone* that includes the entire MTS and port infrastructures. Mission requirements within each of these zones are met by our maritime trident of forces: *Maritime Patrol Forces (MPF)* that include major cutter and fixed-wing assets operating within the offshore zone to detect, monitor, and interdict threats as an element of a layered offense to protect our maritime border, as well as an element to render assistance to mariners in distress; *Shore-Based Forces (SBF)* that operate within the coastal and inshore zones as an element of a layered defense to bolster maritime safety, security, and stewardship; and, *Deployable Specialized Forces (DSF)* that are regionally based and globally deployed to fully integrate with MPF and SBF, applying advanced TTP while conducting maritime security and stewardship operations.

There are two components to our operations – prevention and response. Prevention mitigates vulnerability to threats and bolsters resiliency during contingencies, while response draws upon command and control

Figure 1. PACAREA Forces

People

Active Duty – 10,000
Reserve – 2,500
Civilian – 500
Auxiliary – 6,000

Assets

National Security Cutters (418’) – 4
High Endurance Cutters (378’) – 5
Medium Endurance Cutters (210-283’) – 4
Ice Breakers (399-420’) – 3
Patrol Boats (87-110’) – 38
Buoy Tenders (65-225’) – 14
Response Boats (23-47’) – 233
Airplanes (HC-130H) – 12
Helicopters (MH-65C/D) – 24
Helicopters (MH-60T) – 15

Units

Districts – 4
Sectors – 11
Air Stations – 10
Maritime Safety and Security Teams – 5
Port Security Units – 8
Regional Dive Lockers – 3

relationships and TTP that apply to our maritime trident of forces, which are either pre-deployed or at a heightened state of readiness to respond to contingencies. Prevention and response operations are interdependent and collectively contribute to courses of action in mitigating enduring and emerging threats.

External Factors. The Budget Control Act will continue to exert downward fiscal pressure over the next five years at a time when:

- unfettered and diversified activity of TOC networks erode good governance, rule of law, and regional stability in the Eastern Pacific that is fomented in part by our Nation's annual consumption of nearly 400 metric tons of cocaine and growing demand for heroin and methamphetamine;
- international maritime trade volume across the Pacific transit routes and sea lanes of communication is on the rise and enables a just-in-time inventory economy;
- regional instability and unilateral action by state and non-state actors pose a threat against the Homeland, our allies, and partners;
- the drawdown in Afghanistan similarly decreased Overseas Contingency Operations funding that sustained the readiness of our Port Security Units (PSUs);
- the decommissioning of the USN's Oliver Hazard Perry class of frigates has diminished counter drug surface asset coverage in the Western Caribbean and Eastern Pacific;
- cyber proliferation will persist with attacks launched against the public and private sectors;
- global climate change will enable increased human activity in the Arctic; elevate concerns in low-lying Pacific Island Nation (PIN) communities; and, spawn potentially more frequent and severe tropical cyclones on a global scale;
- competition for dwindling fish stocks will threaten the sovereignty of remote EEZs;
- climate change and dwindling fish stocks may trigger migration from PINs;
- the "ring of fire" that generates 90% of the world's earthquakes and devastating tsunamis across the Pacific will persist; and,
- the terrorist threat in PACAREA's AOR from foreign and homegrown violent extremists remains a persistent concern, while the maritime counterterrorism capacity on the West coast is nascent.

An Imperative for Partnerships, Unity of Effort, and Innovation. PACAREA does not have the organic capacity to meet all mission requirements and must continually and innovatively build upon our network of joint service, international, federal, state, local, and tribal partnerships, while maintaining dynamic and transparent interactions with our stakeholders in the private sector. Similarly, we must leverage the Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) Plan and Protocols, memorandums of agreement (MOAs), bilateral agreements and treaties, combined operating guidelines, and DHS policies to include Regional Coordinating Mechanisms (ReCoMs) that instill *unity of effort* in planning and executing maritime security operations. We must emphasize and demonstrate proficiency in the Incident Command System (ICS) as **the** universal language among first responders for establishing unity of effort and coordinating all-hazards response operations during natural and man-made disasters. Finally, it is imperative that we exploit existing and emerging technologies, including unmanned aerial systems (UAS), to bolster operational effectiveness and efficiency.

Risk-Based Decision Making. PACAREA allocates its maritime trident of forces to: protect those on the sea; protect the Nation from threats delivered by the sea; and, protect the sea itself, which correlates to maritime safety, security, and stewardship, respectively. The level of effort that is allocated to each of these three categories of mission drivers is dynamic and requires a risk-based approach whenever resources are pulled from one mission set to augment another. Operational risk management must be informed by comprehensive maritime domain awareness (MDA) and intelligence to enable decision making, reduce risk, and increase certainty of outcomes. Operations that we execute must focus on the measure of our effectiveness – outcomes. Too often we measure *activity* with no correlating outcome (i.e., number of inspections, escorts, aids to navigation maintained and boardings conducted, as well as days away from homeport among major cutters and resource hours consumed by aviation, patrol boat, and boat forces). Accordingly, we must refine our *outcome* measures of effectiveness that are inherently governmental and reflective of the objectives codified in the QHSR. While offsets to mission areas of emphasis may be necessary in allocating resources, **national security, economic security, and safety of life and property at sea shall be held sacrosanct.**

Intelligence-Driven Operations. The elements of “partnerships,” particularly within the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC), and “risk-based decision making” culminate with the integration of intelligence and operations. The multi-mission character and ready posture of our trident of forces enable an agile response on a global scale to emerging and imminent threats. Effectively executed intelligence, focused on the specific needs and priorities of the operational commander, allow us to make best use of resources and the situation at hand. PACAREA shall aggressively surge forces based on assessed threats and then will tailor those forces commensurate with the latest intelligence, as opposed to an incremental “ramp-up” of capability that does not ensure mission success.

Sustained Operational Excellence. The proficiency of our maritime trident of forces and readiness of our platforms are foundational to sustained operational excellence. As our missions grow more complex and competencies more specialized, we must continually assess the proficiency of our forces and any obstacles that might stymie growth along the proficiency continuum. In particular, any budget-driven reduction to frontline operations has the potential to erode the experience level among our current journey men and women who will be called upon in future years to fill senior leadership positions as subject matter experts. Likewise, we must critically assess and measure the readiness of our platforms, as well as the root causes detracting from readiness. This will require dynamic interaction across the USCG’s Deputy Commandant for Mission Support enterprise. At no time shall we deviate from safe to sail and fly criteria and our service motto, *Semper Paratus* (“Always Ready”).

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of the PACAREA *Strategic Intent* is to guide operations over Fiscal Years (FY) 2015-19. A risk-based approach is used to identify theater-wide areas of emphasis and allocate resources across PACAREA's AOR. The *Strategic Intent* communicates PACAREA's contributions and measures of effectiveness as they apply to our Nation's maritime safety, security, and stewardship.

The *Strategic Intent* aligns with the National Security Strategy,¹ National Strategy for Homeland Security,² National Military Strategy,³ National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security,⁴ National Drug Control Strategy,⁵ National Strategy for Maritime Security,⁶ National Strategy for the Arctic Region,⁷ and A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.⁸ The Strategic Intent complements USCG strategic planning activities to include annualized fiscal and operational planning guidance, as well as the Commandant's Direction 2014⁹ and Commandant's Strategic Intent 2015-2019.¹⁰

As noted in the Introduction, PACAREA's 24/7 readiness and response posture to threats affecting national security, as well as safety of life and property at sea, shall always be our highest priorities. The *Strategic Intent* subsequently outlines six theater-wide areas of emphasis that will inform PACAREA operations in FY15-19:

- Global Supply Chain Security
- Fisheries
- Arctic
- Transnational Organized Crime
- Complex Contingency Response
- Defense Operations

Each area of emphasis is described in terms of ends, ways, and means. Furthermore, these areas of emphasis are guided by assessments related to PACAREA's Priority Intelligence Requirements, as well as the QHSR¹¹ that focuses upon the following five objectives:

- Preventing terrorism
- Securing our borders
- Enforcing immigration laws
- Securing cyberspace
- Ensuring resilience

Major regional trends (societal, technological, economic, environmental, governance) in PACAREA's AOR are expected to maintain current trajectories in FY15-19, barring unforeseen catastrophic events or disruptive technologies. These trends forecast a PACAREA AOR that is more:

- *Competitive* – growing demand for goods and services will increase pressure on the global supply chain;
- *Connected* – expanded access to and availability of technology will fuel economic growth and communications, some beyond state control;
- *Complex* – rising influence of emerging state and non-state actors will generate new constraints and opportunities for government decision-making;

- *Consequential* – climate change, increasing frequency of major disasters, and growing demand on ecosystem services will test nations’ resilience;
- *Concentrated* – population growth and urbanization will continue at significant levels; and,
- *Constrained* – swelling acquisition, training, and maintenance costs will be complicated by a fiscally constrained U.S. federal budget.

The *Strategic Intent* does not provide specific budgetary or acquisition guidance. Instead, it aims to provide strategic direction to guide PACAREA’s 13,000 active, reserve, and civilian members, augmented by 6,000 volunteer Auxiliarists, to successful performance outcomes. The *Strategic Intent* will serve to inform the development of the operational and tactical relationship between PACAREA staff, districts, and sectors with those of our strategic partners that are unique to USCG authorities.

AUTHORITIES

PACAREA executes our broad authorities as a military service, as well as a law enforcement, regulatory, humanitarian, and intelligence service, to bolster maritime safety, security, and stewardship. PACAREA implements its authorities through regulations and operations pursuant to 65 bilateral agreements (45 counterdrug, 11 proliferation security, 9 fisheries shiprider¹²), National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP), and Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) in the National Response Framework (NRF). PACAREA is designated as the lead federal agency for maritime safety, security, and stewardship of U.S. citizens, resources, interests, allies, and partners in PACAREA's AOR.

The USCG's operational zones — offshore, coastal, and inshore — overlap with recognized U.S. and international jurisdictional classifications such as internal waters, customs waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone, EEZ, and the high seas. We take these jurisdictional classifications into account when planning and executing our missions.

Offshore Zone

Abroad, the International Port Security (IPS) Program assesses foreign ports to determine compliance with the International Maritime Organization's (IMO) International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. Countries found non-compliant are added to a Port Security Advisory and conditions of entry are imposed on vessels recently visiting those countries to include being required to take additional security precautions, submitting to boarding by the USCG before being granted permission to enter, and being refused entry in specific cases. Marine Inspectors at the USCG Activities Far East (FEACT) in Japan and Marine Inspection Detachment (MIDET) in Singapore check vessels for compliance with international conventions and U.S. standards.

Prevention (to reduce the probability of an adverse event) and response (to minimize consequences when an adverse event does occur) are inextricably linked and a fundamental aspect of PACAREA's operations.¹³ Prevention emphasizes the need to identify hazards and threats, reduce vulnerabilities and minimize the requirement for emergency response by helping to preempt avoidable casualties, damage, and other harm through regulations, inspections, properly maintained waterways, and port activity monitoring.¹⁴ For example, Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) regulations and enforcement mitigate unsafe operations that could potentially contribute to search and rescue (SAR) response. PACAREA is empowered to board, examine, and inspect vessels, not necessarily based on suspicion that a violation already exists, but to enforce federal laws and regulations, per 14 USC § 89 as delegated by the USCG.

Being a member of the IC (50 USC § 3001) is critical to advancing MDA. PACAREA relies on our intelligence capabilities to pre-position forces where the threats to maritime safety, security, and stewardship are greatest. The USCG's Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center-Pacific (MIFC-PAC), created in September 2003, serves as a key conduit for the fusion, analysis, and dissemination of all source intelligence at the operational and tactical levels. The USCG Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC) and MIFCs, as well as U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) National Targeting Center (NTC), use information from the USCG's 96-hour Advanced Notice of Arrival (ANOVA), CBP's advance electronic cargo manifest rule, and CBP's Automated Targeting System (ATS) to vet cargo, passengers, and vessels.

While the USCG is a component of the DHS per the Homeland Security Act of 2002, it is also designated as one of the five military services and a branch of the Armed Forces (10 USC § 101; 14 USC § 1). A 2004 agreement between the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security established the position of Commander, Defense Force West (CG DEFORWEST), whereby the PACAREA Commander in a dual-hatted

capacity serves in a continuous role within the DOD chain of command and can support or be supported by a Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) for MHD and homeland security missions. Title 10 defines the USCG as an Armed Force, and as such, Coast Guardsmen are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, deployable worldwide, and safeguard the homeland. USCG cutters (USCGCs) are sovereign naval warships that enjoy the right of approach and the right of visit over foreign vessels encountered in international waters. Title 10 authorities make the USCG a valuable instrument of national power and enhance PACAREA's ability to perform operations in support of the five objectives identified in the QHSR.

Title 10 also provides authorities for the USN to assist the USCG in law enforcement operations to include: sharing information collected during military operations; using military equipment and facilities, or providing DOD personnel to operate and maintain that equipment; and, deploying USCG Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETs) aboard USN vessels and allied warships to enforce U.S. law. The USCG assumes tactical control (TACON) of USN units with an embarked LEDET once the mission transitions from detection and monitoring to a law enforcement boarding operation. The Oceania Maritime Security Initiative (OMSI) is a joint DOD and USCG operational program which leverages DOD surface assets transiting the region with embarked LEDETs and PIN shipriders to patrol remote EEZs, enforce bilateral and multilateral regional fisheries agreements, and combat transnational crime. PACAREA works with USN to enhance readiness and interoperability for counternarcotics and maritime law enforcement operations, such as the FOXHUNT process, which certifies USN's Third Fleet (C3F) competencies in providing mobility for maritime law enforcement, including Airborne Use of Force (AUF).

The USCG is the only U.S. Armed Force, by law and policy, authorized to conduct law enforcement operations. The USCG, unlike DOD Services, is not constrained by the Posse Comitatus Act. Our authorities as an Armed Force and law enforcement agency enable PACAREA to address ambiguous risks that do not meet the criteria for traditional military solutions and allow for an incremental escalation of force as dictated by the threat.

PACAREA, per authorities delegated from the USCG, has lead federal agency responsibility for enduring threats to our Nation, such as illicit drug and migrant trafficking in the Pacific. The USCG is designated in the 1999 National Drug Control Strategy as the lead federal agency for maritime drug interdiction and the co-lead for air interdiction.¹⁵ The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1989 designated DOD as the lead federal agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States.¹⁶ Subsequently, the USCG was designated as the lead federal agency for the interdiction and apprehension of illegal drug traffickers on the high seas. The USCG has developed non-binding operational procedures with Mexico, Ecuador, and Peru to facilitate communications between operations centers for the confirmation of vessel registry or nationality and for permission to stop, board, and search vessels. The USCG is the lead federal agency for enforcing laws and treaties relating to migrants at sea beyond U.S. territorial waters, as defined in the 1993 Presidential Decision Directive 9 (PDD-9) on Alien Smuggling. PACAREA enforces U.S. law that reflects international regimes to include the 1988 United Nations (UN) Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 2000 Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air supplementing the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, and various IMO resolutions.

PACAREA, per authorities delegated from the USCG, has lead at-sea fisheries enforcement responsibility in the Pacific per the 1976 Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act. PACAREA has direct enforcement responsibility for the 1950 Tuna Conventions Act (as amended 2000), 1972 Marine Mammal Protection Act (as amended 2007), 1973 Endangered Species Act (as amended 2003), 1992 Central Bering Sea Fisheries Enforcement Act (as amended 1995), and the 1995 High Seas Fishing Compliance Act (as amended 2000). PACAREA enforces the 1992 High Seas Driftnet Fishing Enforcement Act, furthering the objectives expressed in UN General Assembly Resolution 46/215. PACAREA enforces various international agreements to include the 1988 South Pacific Tuna Treaty (as amended 1991), 1995 UN Agreement for the Conservation

and Management of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (commonly referred to as the UN Fish Stocks Agreement), and 2009 interim measures for High Seas Fisheries in the North Pacific Ocean.¹⁷

PACAREA, per 46 USC and other authorities delegated from the USCG, regulates Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) facilities, mobile offshore drilling units (MODUs), and vessels engaged in OCS energy and mineral development activities, including, but not limited to, tank vessels, offshore supply vessels, and other vessels involved in the transfer of certain cargoes.

PACAREA enforces various international agreements related to environmental stewardship to include the IMO's 1973 International Convention and 1978 Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), 2004 International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships' Ballast Water and Sediments, and 1990 Convention on Oil Pollution, Preparedness, Response and Cooperation. As the U.S. Senate considers accession to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), PACAREA continues to act in accordance with customary international law and practice to protect U.S. rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea and airspace.

Coastal Zone

PACAREA enforces federal law on waters subject to U.S. jurisdiction and in international waters (14 USC §§ 2, 89). PACAREA can board, search, detain, arrest, and seize violators (14 USC §§ 2, 89); protect endangered species, prevent illegal taking of marine mammals and fish, and guard against encroachment into the U.S. EEZ (16 USC); and, enforce regulations that address working conditions on drilling and production operations on the OCS (43 USC) and elsewhere in the maritime domain. PACAREA ensures the safe operation of U.S. flagged vessels, exercises Port State authority of foreign vessels, maintains an ice patrol (46 USC), and has the authority to perform customs officer duties (19 USC). Marine inspectors, typically in U.S. waters, ensure ships calling on U.S. ports comply with international conventions and U.S. standards.

The MOTR Plan, a Presidentially-approved plan to achieve a coordinated USG response to threats against the United States and its interests in the maritime domain, uses established protocols and an integrated network of national-level interagency procedures to develop courses of action to include supported and supporting relationships, as well as case disposition.

The USCG and Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) perform Integrated Cross-Border Maritime Law Enforcement Operations (ICMLEO), under the auspices of the Shiprider Program, to enable continuity of enforcement and security operations across the border and facilitate cross-border surveillance and interdiction.

Inshore Zone


The 2002 Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) designated USCG Captains of the Port (COTPs) as Federal Maritime Security Coordinators (FMSC) to lead development of Area Maritime Security (AMS) plans with port stakeholders. Combined with authorities as Officer-in-Charge of Marine Inspection (OCMI), Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC), and SAR Mission Coordinator, COTPs are vital to leading federal efforts to strengthen national security, promote economic growth, safeguard the MTS, and enhance our Nation's resiliency to natural and man-made disasters.

PACAREA enforces regulations governing the discharge of oil in U.S. navigable waterways per the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90). PACAREA has direct enforcement responsibility for the 2011 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)-USCG agreement to jointly enforce U.S. and international air pollution requirements for vessels operating in U.S. waters. The Clean Water Act provides PACAREA the authority for pollution prevention, contingency planning, and response activities. The USCG's National Pollution Funds Center

administers the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund and portions of the Hazardous Substance Superfund of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, and the Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.

PACAREA ensures effective and integrated mission support during contingency operations that enable DHS to meet NRF requirements. PACAREA could be requested to support the NRF's ESFs to include Transportation (ESF 1), Information and Planning (ESF 5), Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing, and Human Services (ESF 6), SAR (ESF 9), Oil and Hazardous Materials Response (ESF 10), Public Safety and Security (ESF 13), and External Affairs (ESF 15).

Figure 2. Select Authorities, Partnerships, Capabilities, and Competencies in Operational Zones*



* Listed authorities may apply in more than one zone.

PARTNERSHIPS

PACAREA leverages robust, enduring, and trusted partnerships with international, federal, state, local, and tribal agencies, as well as with private industry and communities, to improve performance outcomes by enhancing our capability, effectiveness, and credibility. PACAREA's partnerships, internationally and throughout the MTS, provide situational awareness and access to vital links in the global maritime supply chain. PACAREA synchronizes U.S. interagency response efforts by using the NRF, ICS, and MOTR Plan and Protocols.

Offshore Zone

International partnerships are critical to PACAREA's ability to extend the outer limit of the U.S. maritime border, build partner nation capacity to improve maritime security and governance, and enhance MDA and information sharing. PACAREA will explore engagement and partnership opportunities with the 71 countries in its AOR, consistent with U.S. foreign policy objectives and budgetary realities.

PACAREA's approach to international engagement and partnerships is guided by the USCG's 2010 International Strategic Guidance Manual and 2015 Foreign Affairs Policy Manual, which identify four strategic objectives: build and leverage force-multiplying international partnerships; maximize global maritime awareness; shape international regulations and standards; and, support U.S. national security, homeland security, and foreign policy.¹⁸ To accomplish this, PACAREA leverages training, technical assistance, and Foreign Military Sales and Leases to build capability and capacity, enhance the rule of law, promote regional stability and security, and increase interoperability. PACAREA supports U.S. Department of State (DOS) and DOD security cooperation and foreign assistance programs; builds strong partnerships with those nations and organizations that serve as force multipliers in advancing U.S. maritime interests and rule of law; leverages a network of USCG attachés and liaison officers assigned to select U.S. embassies; and, conducts maritime assessments, training, and consultation to close gaps in global maritime safety, security, and environmental protection.

PACAREA is the USCG's Principal Planning Agent (PPA) with U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM). PACAREA provides USPACOM unique capabilities and competencies, especially in Phase 0 "shaping" operations, to include training foreign military and government forces to build capacity for maritime security, maritime governance, and civil administration. PACAREA coordinates USCG participation in international engagement operations at the DOD theater level and supports USPACOM's contingency and theater campaign plans. DOD provides cutting-edge technology to the USCG, including Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) and major weapons systems, which enhance PACAREA's operational performance and interoperability with other Armed Forces. PACAREA works with U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) – not a formal PPA relationship – on a broad range of topics to include the North American Maritime Security Initiative (NAMSI), the Arctic, MHD,¹⁹ and complex contingency response (CCR).

PACAREA partners with U.S. Pacific Fleet (CPF) to enhance theater-wide maritime homeland security and MHD by developing and updating plans, conducting training, participating in exercises, and improving coordination and information sharing via personnel exchanges – USN Liaison Officers are located at PACAREA, USCG District 14, and USCG District 17; USCG Liaison Officers (CGLOs) are located at USPACOM, CPF, and C3F. PACAREA coordinates maritime security efforts with CPF to include: embarking LEDETs to conduct maritime law enforcement operations aboard naval vessels to disrupt narcotics trafficking in the Eastern Pacific and illegal fishing in Oceania as part of OMSI; participating in the annual Three-Party Staff Talks, along with Canadian Maritime Forces Pacific (MARPAF), to close gaps in maritime homeland security

and homeland defense, as well as improve humanitarian aid and disaster relief (HA/DR) plans and operations; sharing information to enhance MDA; and, participating in exercises to enhance interoperability. PACAREA supports USN Seventh Fleet's (C7F) theater security cooperation (TSC) plans by participating in regional exercises associated with joint Operation Plans (OPLANS) and conducting partner nation capacity-building to improve interoperability, readiness, and maritime security.

The North Pacific Coast Guard Forum (NPCGF) has brought together, since 2000, the coast guards and civil maritime organizations of Canada, China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States to conduct combined operations, training, exercises, and information sharing to safeguard international maritime commerce, protect fisheries, stem illegal drug trafficking, and deter human smuggling. PACAREA will leverage the NPCGF's multilateral working relationships to deepen bilateral engagement with its member nations.

PACAREA provides support to the Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF), an operationally-focused, consensus-based organization established in 2015 that seeks to leverage collective resources to foster safe, secure, and environmentally responsible maritime activity in the Arctic. Membership includes Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States.

PACAREA will build on emerging opportunities to strengthen existing bilateral and multilateral relationships and develop new ones. Navies and maritime agencies from other nations that conduct "coast guard" missions seek to collaborate with PACAREA, given our Armed Force and law enforcement authorities, on a broad range of maritime issues, such as port security, fisheries and EEZ enforcement, SAR, and environmental protection and pollution response. PACAREA exercises bilateral counterdrug and fisheries "shiprider" agreements, in which foreign law enforcement officers ride aboard USCG vessels or aircraft to enable timely information sharing that facilitate coordinated interdiction operations on the high seas and within a partner nation's territorial sea.

PACAREA assists foreign nations to develop their capacity and capability for maritime safety, security, and stewardship, and in doing so, strengthens regional stability and maritime security. For example, vessel transfers deepen U.S. regional partnerships, enhance interoperability with our partners, and contribute to regional safety and security. The USCG provides a broad range of maritime law enforcement training to partner nations to include SAR, marine safety, international rule of law, port security, and crisis management, as well as providing many nations the Search and Rescue Optimal Planning System (SAROPS).

The USG does not take sides in competing territorial claims in the East and South China Seas. The USG encourages the resolution of disputes in a peaceful and cooperative manner that supports fundamental principles of freedom of navigation, lawful commerce, and respect for international law.

Coastal Zone

PACAREA participates in the DHS's ReCoMs, composed of CBP, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), and state and local law enforcement partners, which target TOC networks along Southern California's coastal border.²⁰ PACAREA works with C3F and federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to instill unity of effort while protecting our southwest maritime border against illicit trafficking.

A 2011 MOA between the USCG and U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) identifies roles and responsibilities for the issuance of leases and approval of Site Assessment Plans, General Activity Plans, and Construction and Operations Plans for offshore renewable energy installations on the OCS. The USCG participates in the DOI-led Interagency Working Group (IWG) on Coordination of Domestic Energy Development and Permitting in Alaska (established by Executive Order 13580) to synchronize the efforts of federal agencies responsible for

overseeing the safe and responsible development of Alaska's onshore and offshore energy resources and associated infrastructure. PACAREA works with DOI on maritime stewardship to include jointly investigating marine pollution and casualty incidents.

Inshore Zone

PACAREA is responsible for the protection of the MTS and maritime domain in its AOR. The USCG has been responsible for the security of U.S. seaports since the enactment of the Espionage Act of 1917. Activities include preparedness planning and exercises, initiatives to enhance the resilience of maritime critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) and MTS, execution of Maritime Security and Response Operations (MSRO) to include antiterrorism and counterterrorism activities, and initial recovery efforts after attacks. These activities are primarily directed by USCG Sector Commanders serving as FMSC and rely upon the USCG's broad authorities and long-standing partnerships with governmental, maritime industry, and international partners.

The Sector Commander and staff regularly share information with federal, state, local, and tribal authorities, as well as the maritime industry. This may include meetings of standing coordinating bodies, such as the Area Maritime Security Committee (AMSC). The Sector Commander issues orders and regulations under FMSC, COTP, and/or OCMI authorities to control movements and activities of non-government vessels, facilities, and personnel to ensure the safety and security of the MTS. If an incident occurs, sector personnel conduct crisis response and incident management operations under the ICS, NRF, and NCP. PACAREA will seek to enhance collaboration and coordination with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), particularly Regions IX and X.

With respect to infrastructure permitting, PACAREA works with the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) and other federal agencies to implement the USCG Bridge Program, which is responsible for issuing bridge permits approving the location and plans of all new bridges, modification of existing bridges, international bridges, and causeways in or over navigable waterways of the United States.


International & Select District Partnerships:

- **District 11 (D11):** PACAREA serves as the primary operational point of engagement with the Mexican Navy's (SEMAR) senior leadership. D11 leads USCG engagement with SEMAR's four Eastern Pacific naval regions at the tactical level. NAMSI is a forum between SEMAR, the Government of Canada, USCG, and USNORTHCOM that generated a Maritime Operations Letter of Intent (an operational relationship typically achieved through bilateral agreements) and standards and procedures for communications between countries' operations centers to improve patrol and boarding interoperability. D11 also leads tactical engagement with Central and South American partner nations. The USCG has provided extensive training to Colombia on maritime law enforcement, SAR, and vessel boarding. Colombia is now sharing its security expertise by training over 20 other countries. The Multilateral Maritime Counterdrug Summit brings together Central and South American participants, with the USCG, to develop TTP to counter TOC. Operation Martillo, a U.S., European, and Western Hemisphere effort, denies TOC networks the ability to exploit Central American shipping routes.²¹ D11 works with Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South, the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) Executive Agent, to leverage DOD assets to prevent illicit trafficking. D11 detailed a Judge Advocate General officer to the Assistant U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles to support prosecution of illicit trafficking.
- **District 13 (D13):** PACAREA leads operational engagement with Canadian Naval Forces via the Three-Party Staff Talks. D13 leads tactical engagement with Canada. D13 works with Canada to advance the "Beyond the Border" Initiative and performs ICMLEO under the Shiprider Program (joint patrol of

maritime border), Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (border interdiction operations), Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (investigative taskforces), and Cross Border Crime Forum. The United States and Canada pursue joint operations against suspected drug transshipments and have an agreement that enables the USCG to embark on Canadian aircraft and ships.

- **District 14 (D14):** D14 leads engagement with Japan, PINs, and Singapore. The USCG serves as the U.S. Executive Agent for the Quadrilateral Defense Cooperation Talks (“Quads”) with Australia, France, and New Zealand to enhance regional maritime safety and security, including fisheries enforcement. The Compact of Free Association (COFA) provides U.S. security and economic assistance to the Federated States of Micronesia, Republic of the Marshall Islands, and Republic of Palau, and in doing so, bolsters regional stability, safety, and security among PINs. OMSI leverages DOD assets to increase MDA and maritime law enforcement operations in Oceania. D14 collaborates with the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), and South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organization (SPRFMO) to enforce fisheries regulations and enhance maritime governance. D14 works with JIATF West, the USPACOM Executive Agent, to leverage DOD assets to prevent illicit trafficking. D14 coordinates the activities of FEACTION, which provides marine safety and maritime security services to promote regional security and an uninterrupted MTS, and its MIDET in Singapore.
- **District 17 (D17):** D17 leads engagement with Russia and Arctic nations. D17 supports U.S. engagement in the Arctic Council to include establishment of the 2011 Arctic SAR Agreement and 2013 Arctic Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response Agreement. The United States is the current Arctic Council chair (2015-2017). D17 actively engages Arctic tribal and local governments, maintaining a full-time Tribal Liaison Officer (TLO) and is an active member of federal IWGs, such as the IWG on Coordination of Domestic Energy Development and Permitting in Alaska, IWG on the Arctic Outer Continental Shelf, and the Alaska Arctic Policy Commission. D17 works with the North Pacific Anadromous Fisheries Commission (NPAFC), North Pacific Fisheries Management Council (NPFMC), and WCPFC to enforce fisheries regulations and enhance maritime governance.

Figure 3. PACAREA Liaison Presence in the Pacific



AREAS OF EMPHASIS

USCG Publication 3-0 on Operations states that our Nation’s maritime interests are enduring, while priorities and requirements for operations within the maritime domain are dynamic.²²

The Pacific is faced with myriad risks. Increasing flows – legal and illegal – of people, cargo, conveyances, money, weather, germs, and CBRNE pre-cursor materials are creating greater operational demands on PACAREA. These risks do not always fall neatly within the categories of security, safety, and stewardship. They often require complex, multidimensional, and integrated solutions that PACAREA, in collaboration with domestic and international partners, delivers.

The USCG employs security-in-depth to conduct prevention and response operations.²³ Personnel and assets are deployed and stationed – 24/7 – in layers in the offshore, coastal, and inshore operational areas to prevent and respond to threats well before they reach U.S. waters and the MTS.²⁴ USCG forces reduce the risk of security incidents by identifying and addressing vulnerabilities to threats, then detecting, interdicting and defeating threats before they approach U.S. shores.²⁵ USCG forces maintain high states of readiness to enable immediate or rapid response to threats or incidents, as well as assistance with initial recovery.

The following areas of emphasis associated with external risks will inform PACAREA operations in FY15-19:

- Global Supply Chain Security
- Fisheries
- Arctic
- Transnational Organized Crime
- Complex Contingency Response
- Defense Operations

GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY

*Create and protect a global supply chain system that supports innovation and prosperity by securely and reliably moving goods within our domestic borders and around the world in a timely manner.*²⁶
(2012 National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security)

RISK ASSESSMENT:

Threat – The global supply chain, a just-in-time intermodal transportation system of ports, waterways, highways, and railways, as well as the technology by which goods and services move from supplier to consumer, is susceptible to disruptions caused by natural disasters (i.e., hurricanes, earthquakes, tsunamis, floods, droughts) or events (i.e., collisions, labor disputes, terrorism, embargoes), and exploitation by TOC. Cyber threats are as ubiquitous as cyber vulnerabilities. Threats of cyber incidents and attacks continue to grow substantially each year, which are attributable to various origins from state actors and criminal organizations to end-user mistakes and compromises. Integrated supply chains are fast and cost-efficient but also susceptible to shocks that can rapidly escalate from localized events into broader disruptions.²⁷

Vulnerability – PACAREA's AOR is a critical gateway to the MTS²⁸ with nearly 25% of major national ports and five of the top 10 U.S. container ports.²⁹ Over 30% of U.S. shipments (\$1 billion per day) transit the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach – the only two U.S. ports among the world's top 20 container ports.³⁰ Nearly 80% of inbound U.S. cargo originates from 60 of 700 global ports.³¹ Single points of failure along the global supply chain and variable resiliency of ports have the potential to negatively impact U.S. economic and national security. While global shipping is expected to increase due to gradual U.S. economic recovery and Panama Canal expansion, constrained budgetary conditions will likely impact MSRO³² and gaps exist in capabilities to detect anomalous, illegitimate maritime commerce. The rapid evolution of cyber threats to the MTS, which is increasingly embracing technology to enhance efficiency, poses a substantial challenge to both government regulators and industry who seek to secure the cyberspace where vital systems operate. Industrial Control System and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) networks contain computers and applications that perform key functions in providing essential services and commodities (i.e., electricity, natural gas, gasoline, water, waste treatment, transportation) to all Americans.³³ As such, they are part of the Nation's critical infrastructure and require protection from a variety of cyber threats.³⁴

Consequence – Ninety-five percent of U.S. commerce transits by sea, generating nearly \$3.2 trillion of economic activity and 13.3 million U.S. jobs.³⁵ The Asia-Pacific region represents over 40% of global trade³⁶ and includes the top four U.S. trading partners (seven of the top 15).³⁷ U.S. goods exports to Asia-Pacific were \$698 billion in 2013 (44% of total).³⁸ Each year, \$5.3 trillion of trade passes through the South China Sea with U.S. trade accounting for \$1.2 trillion.³⁹ Oil shipments through the Strait of Malacca, linking the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea, were estimated at 15 million barrels per day (bbl/d) in 2011, which was one-third of all seaborne oil and 17% of average daily worldwide oil consumption (88.3 million bbl/d).⁴⁰

PACAREA APPROACH:

Capabilities – MPF, comprised of USCG cutters and aircraft and their crews, are critical to supply chain security. These assets conduct prevention and response operations through patrol, presence, and at-sea operations that include interdiction, boarding, enforcement, and SAR. Major cutters, patrol boats, and DSF embarked in cutters, USN, or allied ships – supported by MPA – provide armed, persistent presence, and command-and-control capabilities throughout the maritime domain, particularly within and between

our Nation's vast EEZs and those of our international partners. These adaptive forces can be surged to address threats early. National Security Cutters (NSCs) are able to launch boats and aircraft in sea state five – 24/7 – in response to threats and can operate in a CBRNE environment by virtue of countermeasure systems. MPF also conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities in support of USCG and national requirements. Major cutters' sophisticated C4ISR suites and interoperability with other federal, state, and local agencies provide intelligence-gathering capabilities that contribute to MDA in all three operational zones. Well before vessels arrive in U.S. ports, the USCG's ICC and MIFCs, as well as the CBP's NTC, use information from the USCG's ANOA, CBP's advance electronic cargo manifest rule, and CBP's ATS to vet cargo, passengers, and vessels. The USCG's National Vessel Movement Center (NVMC) is a clearinghouse for vessel notice of arrival and departure information, which is shared with CBP and the National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC) through the ship arrival notification system (SANS) and is loaded into the Marine Information for Safety and Law Enforcement (MISLE) system. PACAREA extracts SANS data to assess security or safety risk of vessels and crew arriving or departing from U.S. ports.

In the coastal zone, MPF, SBF, and DSF conduct operations through a combination of scheduled prevention operations, patrols, and response operations.⁴¹ USCG forces maintain high states of readiness to enable immediate or rapid response to threats or incidents.⁴² USCG helicopters, cutters, and boats monitor, track, interdict, and deliver boarding teams to vessels of interest. The U.S. Aids to Navigation (ATON) System facilitates safety of navigation. In the inshore zone, small cutters, SBF, DSF, and aviation forces conduct prevention and response operations and maintain high states of readiness to enable immediate or rapid response to threats or incidents.⁴³ Marine Inspectors conduct safety and security inspections of regulated U.S. vessels, facilities, and foreign vessels in U.S. ports to ensure compliance with applicable U.S. and international laws and standards. Marine investigators determine causal factors in maritime incidents and make recommendations for changes in policy, procedure, or law to prevent recurrence. Pollution investigators rapidly respond to reports of oil or hazardous substance spills. The USCG's Nationwide Automatic Identification System (AIS) enhances MDA, and the Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) provides advice in waterways to prevent collisions, allisions, and groundings.

Competencies – Abroad, the IPS Program assesses foreign ports to determine compliance with the IMO's ISPS Code. Countries found non-compliant are added to a Port Security Advisory and conditions of entry are imposed on vessels recently visiting those countries to include being required to take additional security precautions, submitting to boarding by the USCG before being granted permission to enter, and being refused entry in specific cases. Marine Inspectors at FEACT in Japan and MIDET in Singapore check for compliance with SOLAS and MARPOL conventions, as well as U.S. standards. FEACT is responsible for facilitating international engagement across 41 Pacific nations, primarily implementing the IPS program. As a contracting party of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), PACAREA's Command Center – as the U.S. Focal Point – maintains 24/7 communications and awareness of piracy incidents in Asia impacting the global supply chain.

Short Notice Maritime Response (SNMR) is a time-sensitive response to interdict, board, and control a vessel believed to pose a threat of terrorism or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to the United States.⁴⁴ The USCG does not have forces used solely for SNMR, but employs a combination of operating forces to defeat maritime threats in the offshore, coastal, and inshore operational areas. Eleven Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) ship boarding agreements provide PACAREA the authority to board vessels suspected of carrying WMD. Districts and sectors respond to a SNMR threat immediately by employing SBF or MPF (forces supporting local MOTR) to intercept and maintain on scene presence until regional forces, if needed, can arrive. Regional forces include DSF (e.g., Maritime Security Response Teams, Maritime Safety and Security Teams, National Strike Teams), major cutters, and interagency teams from the DHS and U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). National forces supporting MOTR include

elements from the DOJ, DOD, and U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) that provide the greatest capability for dealing with the highest risk terrorism and WMD proliferation threats.

Closer to home, Sector Commanders issue orders and enforce regulations under COTP, FMSC, and/or OCMI authority to control movements and activities of vessels, facilities, and personnel to ensure the safety and security of the MTS. COTPs use the Maritime Security Risk Assessment Model (MSRAM) to identify key risk drivers and evaluate risk-reduction measures. COTPs also partner closely with their AMSC and other port groups to share information and best practices and promote risk management to address all hazards and all threats, including cyber. PACAREA uses the Common Assessment and Reporting Tool (CART) to characterize a potential incident's impact on the MTS and manage trade resumption. PACAREA, along with federal, state, local, tribal, and port partners, works to monitor critical infrastructure, conduct vessel escorts and patrols, and inspect vessels and facilities. PACAREA's MSRO include waterborne and aerial patrols, as well as armed escorts of hazardous cargos and passenger vessels, in order to reduce the risk of terrorism to the MTS and CIKR.

PACAREA employs a three-tiered system of Maritime Security (MARSEC) levels to communicate pre-planned scalable responses for credible threats.⁴⁵ If the Secretary of Homeland Security issues a National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) Alert, the Commandant will adjust the MARSEC Level, if appropriate, based on the commensurate risk, any maritime nexus, and/or Commandant consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security. NTAS has two alerts: "elevated" that warns of a credible terrorist threat against the United States (potentially related to MARSEC Level 2); and, "imminent" that warns of a credible, specific, and impending terrorist threat against the United States (potentially related to MARSEC Level 3).⁴⁶ MARSEC Level 1 is the level for which minimum appropriate security measures shall be maintained at all times. Given finite resources, PACAREA forces will be surged where the threat is greatest.

KEY PERFORMANCE MEASURES:

- Measurement of capability and capacity to interdict non-compliant vessel offshore
- Improved MDA and situational awareness of non-ISPS compliant ports
- Commercial shipping shifts due to vessel of interest vetting and port security boarding process
- Identification and mitigation of port security vulnerabilities
- Enhanced supply chain resiliency and safety of navigation
- Enhanced readiness of surge forces to include USCG Reservists and Auxiliary
- Promotion of cyber security
- Updated contingency plans

NEXT STEPS:

- Enhance PACAREA supply chain port-of-origin security awareness through improved global prevention-driven operations, partnerships, and knowledge management.
- Capitalize on surveillance, tracking, intelligence resources, and innovation to better support global supply chain security.
- Focus PACAREA outreach initiatives with nations, other government agencies, and industry that support maritime transit security efforts.
- Strengthen national resilience by minimizing disruption to MTS through improved alignment of regional contingency efforts.
- Reduce MTS cyber risk by encouraging assessment of cyber vulnerabilities and proactive adoption of best practices and industry standards.
- Advance the USCG's engagement in MTS cyber risk management by enhancing vital knowledge of the principles of cyber safety and security within the Prevention and Preparedness workforce.

FISHERIES

[C]ombat illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing ... by: strengthening coordination and implementation of existing authorities ..., promot[ing] legally and sustainably caught ... seafood ..., assist[ing] foreign nations in building capacity to combat IUU fishing ..., and identify[ing] opportunities to enhance domestic and international efforts to combat global IUU fishing and seafood fraud.⁴⁷

(2014 Presidential Memorandum – Comprehensive Framework to Combat Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing and Seafood Fraud)

RISK ASSESSMENT:

Threat – World population growth and rising demand for fish protein is creating pressure on fish stocks. IUU fishing continues to undermine the economic and environmental sustainability of fisheries and fish stocks both in the United States and around the world. Global losses attributable to TOC networks from IUU fishing are estimated to be \$10-23 billion annually, weakening profitability for legally caught seafood, fueling illegal trafficking operations, and undermining economic opportunity for legitimate fishermen in the United States and around the world.⁴⁸ IUU fishing activities, particularly underreporting of catch, illegal at-sea transshipment, and High Seas Drift Net (HSDN) fishing, are dynamic, adaptable, highly mobile, and increasingly sophisticated, as IUU fishermen attempt to find and exploit weak links in national and international fisheries regulatory systems. Flags of convenience, as well as ports of convenience, facilitate the wide scope and extent of IUU fishing activities.⁴⁹ Areas under particular IUU threat in the Pacific are the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO), including U.S. and foreign territories, the Bering Sea along the U.S.-Russia Maritime Boundary Line (MBL), and the western portion of the North Pacific near the Japanese and Russian EEZs.

Vulnerability – Relatively abundant, high value fish stocks dispersed over a vast area make the Pacific vulnerable to IUU fishing. The nine disparate locations of the U.S. EEZ⁵⁰ in PACAREA's AOR represent 80%⁵¹ of the total U.S. EEZ and are separated by significant distances that make enforcement logistically and tactically challenging. Pacific fish stocks are vulnerable to global trends, such as overfishing, underreporting of catch, and illegal at-sea transshipment. PACAREA's AOR is responsible for 66% of total U.S. commercial fish landings⁵² and it contains nearly 70% of the global tuna supply.⁵³ An area of the WCPO, known as "the Tuna Belt," contains nearly half of global tuna supply and is among the world's most productive fisheries. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of PINs is largely dependent upon the fishing resources within their respective EEZs. Foreign incursions and exploitation of these resources are directly linked to economic security and regional stability.

Consequence – The U.S. fishing industry within PACAREA's AOR supports approximately 300,000 jobs and contributes \$50 billion per year to the U.S. economy.⁵⁴ Depletion of fish stocks is a shared concern throughout the United States and Pacific, especially for PINs whose economies are dependent on fishing. Second order effects of IUU fishing could destabilize strained PINs, leading to regional instability and exploitation by TOC. Increased fishing will raise the potential for incursions in U.S. and our international partners' EEZs.

PACAREA APPROACH:

Capabilities – MPF, comprised of USCG cutters, aircraft, and DSF, are critical to enforce domestic and international fisheries laws. These assets deploy primarily in offshore and coastal areas to conduct prevention and response operations through patrol, presence, and at-sea operations that include interdiction, boarding, enforcement, and SAR. Given the dangers associated with commercial fishing, PACAREA commits significant resources to complete commercial fishing vessel safety inspections and

forward deploys both ships and aircraft for critical SAR coverage. Cutters provide tactical patrol, persistent presence, and command-and-control capabilities throughout the maritime domain, particularly within and between our Nation's vast EEZ and those of our international partners. MPF also conduct ISR activities in support of USCG and national requirements. Major cutters frequently embark rotary-wing aircraft to increase ISR and interdiction capabilities. UAS are capable of remaining on scene for extended periods of time to collect and disseminate actionable intelligence to provide tactical, on-demand capability and strategic, wide-area surveillance. DSF (i.e., LEDETs) embarked in USN vessels conduct fisheries enforcement activities in support of OMSI, which leverages DOD assets to increase MDA and maritime law enforcement operations in the WCPO. Closer to shore, USCGCs, boats, and aircraft monitor, track, and deliver boarding teams to vessels of interest. IUU fishing constitutes TOC; accordingly, PACAREA applies the same leverage of intelligence capabilities and disciplines to IUU fishing as other forms of TOC.

Competencies – The USCG's Fisheries Enforcement Strategic Plan, Ocean Guardian, identifies three guiding priorities: protect the U.S. EEZ from foreign encroachment, enforce domestic fisheries laws, and ensure compliance with international fisheries agreements.⁵⁵ PACAREA works to implement the USCG-National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) 2013 Cooperative Maritime Strategy, which supports implementation of the 2010 National Oceans policy, by promoting maritime stewardship, conservation, and safety through enforcement of regulations, vessel inspections, and investigations. PACAREA fisheries law enforcement activities are vital to reduce adverse impacts of IUU fishing on living marine resources. The USCG uses NOAA's satellite-based Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS) to track the location of more than 4,000 fishing vessels in the U.S. EEZ and treaty areas. PACAREA trains and operates with interagency and international partners to maintain proficiency, enhance interoperability, promote stewardship, and identify gaps to improve fisheries enforcement.

KEY PERFORMANCE MEASURES:

- Interdiction and interception rates of detected incursions
- Protection of U.S. EEZ from foreign encroachment
- Level of effective enforcement for domestic fishing regulations⁵⁶
- Compliance with international fisheries enforcement agreements
- Increased information sharing with other government agencies (e.g., National Marine Fisheries Service or NMFS reporting/analysis) and international partners

NEXT STEPS:

- Enhance threat-based enforcement, by collaborating with key partners on domestic and international fisheries patrols to maximize the effectiveness of limited resources.
- Increase the frequency of USCG and OMSI patrols in the WCPO to promote regional stability in the PINs and support the joint USN, USCG, and U.S. Marine Corps strategy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.
- Capitalize on technology, intelligence, and partnerships to improve regional situation awareness to enable prioritization of domestic and international fisheries patrols in areas with the greatest vulnerability.
- Replicate OMSI-like opportunities through proactive partnerships with our DOD and foreign partners to increase persistent and effective presence.

ARCTIC

[A]n Arctic region that is stable and free of conflict, where nations act responsibly in a spirit of trust and cooperation, and where economic and energy resources are developed in a sustainable manner that also respects the fragile environment and the interests and cultures of indigenous peoples.⁵⁷
(2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region)

RISK ASSESSMENT:

Threat – Marine casualties are expected to rise as human activities increase in the Arctic, such as resource exploration, eco-tourism, and activism. Over one million tons of cargo transited an Arctic route in 2012, with 480 transits through the Bering Strait (118 percent increase from 2008-2012).⁵⁸ The Arctic is known for some of the most treacherous sea states and extreme weather on the planet with temperatures falling below -50°F. The Polar Ice Cap today is 40% smaller than it was in 1979 with 4.5 million square miles of ice melting between March and September 2012.⁵⁹

Vulnerability – Limited infrastructure and vast distances complicate SAR and spill response, which is exacerbated by cold, ice, and darkness. From Alaska's North Slope, the closest USCG vessel fueling point is 1,000 miles away and USCG air station 800 miles away. Communications are difficult and tools for situational awareness are minimal. Only 11% of the Arctic is surveyed to modern charting standards.⁶⁰ The Bering Strait is a chokepoint for ships transiting the Arctic via the Northwest Passage (along northern Canada) or the Northern Sea Route (from Bering Strait to Barents Sea). Migratory marine species that indigenous communities depend on for subsistence, such as the bowfin whale, are susceptible to increased human activity. Anticipated oil and gas pipelines from the Chukchi Sea to bisect the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System must cross nearly 100 navigable waterways with each crossing requiring a USCG permit. There is no deepwater port in the Arctic, nor is there a USCG air station or shore-side facility. Funding is not included in PACAREA's base budget for Arctic Shield, a multi-month interagency operation consisting of outreach, operations, and capability assessment.

Consequence – The Arctic is estimated to possess 13% of the world's undiscovered oil, 30% of world's undiscovered natural gas, and more than \$1 trillion worth of minerals.⁶¹ The safe and responsible development and permitting of onshore and offshore energy resources and infrastructure in Alaska is critical to national energy security and will help reduce our Nation's dependence on foreign oil.⁶² Half of the U.S. fish stock comes from the U.S. EEZ off of Alaska. Diminished sea ice will shorten routes and increase accessibility of the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route, reducing fuel costs and altering transport of goods from industrial hubs to consumer markets. Increased accessibility and human activity will raise the significance of Arctic maritime issues, such as freedom of navigation, offshore resource exploration, and environmental and cultural preservation. Nations are bolstering their Arctic posture, such as Russia which has 41 icebreakers of at least 10,000 horsepower, with five more under construction and an additional six planned. China is building a second polar icebreaker expected to be operational in 2016.

PACAREA APPROACH:

Capabilities – Major cutters enable PACAREA to provide off-shore presence, command and control, helicopter, and boat capabilities during the ice-free season in the Arctic. This is critical given a lack of shore infrastructure, expense of building permanent infrastructure, and uncertainty of dynamic and evolving Arctic requirements. Arctic Shield is an annual interagency operation consisting of outreach, operations, and assessment of capabilities. Arctic Shield 2015 focused on Alaska's Arctic coast to include a Forward Operating Location (FOL) in Deadhorse; USCGC HEALY supporting scientific research; major

cutters conducting MDA, SAR, and law enforcement; and, an oil spill response and mass rescue exercise in Kotzebue. PACAREA long-range surveillance aircraft and medium-range response aircraft, in support of surface vessels, monitor more than 950,000 square miles off the Alaskan coast. The USCG's ice-capable, sea-going buoy tenders are multi-mission platforms capable of executing all USCG missions. USCG mobile and seasonal assets and facilities have proven to be important enablers for front-line priorities in the Arctic, including SAR operations, securing the maritime border, collecting critical intelligence, planning and responding to potential disasters, and protecting the marine environment. The USCG is responsible for operating and maintaining the U.S. fleet of polar icebreakers that primarily support scientific research: USCGC HEALY (medium) and USCGC POLAR STAR (heavy), the latter completed a \$90 million renovation and returned to an operational status in 2013. In September 2015, the President announced a proposal to accelerate construction of at least one additional heavy icebreaker. As a result, the USCG is evaluating all options to accelerate production of heavy icebreakers and is working with the Administration and Congress to identify resources for these important national investments. PACAREA leverages intelligence capabilities to drive maritime governance missions and decisions.

Competencies – The 2013 USCG Arctic Strategy identified three key strategic objectives over the coming decade: improve awareness, modernize maritime governance, and broaden partnerships. Under the auspices of the NCP, the USCG serves as vice chair of the National Response Team (NRT), co-chair of the Alaska Regional Response Team, and FOSC in the coastal zone. In these roles, the USCG works with Arctic communities of interest to plan for pollution threats, identify areas and resources at risk, and develop response plans for oil spills and hazardous releases. PACAREA has conducted oil-in-ice research since 2010 to include Vessel of Opportunity Skimming System (VOSS) and Spilled Oil Recovery System (SORS), which has improved the USCG's capability and capacity to recover oil in an ice environment. USCGC HEALY supports the National Science Foundation (NSF) and USCG Research and Development Center to study the Arctic environment and develop new technologies to meet USCG response capabilities. District Response Advisory Teams (DRAT) enhance preparedness and assist FOSC and local responders during oil spills. The USCG, in collaboration with the DOT, DOD, NOAA, and other partners, maintains and enhances waterways management, navigational safety and security, efficiency of the MTS, and freedom of navigation and overflight in the Arctic region by using tools such as Port Access Route Studies (PARS) and Waterways Analysis and Management Studies (WAMS). The USCG, DOD (Joint Task Force Alaska), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), NOAA, and University of Alaska Fairbanks are partnering on demonstrations of the usefulness of Arctic UAS flights to collect AIS, meteorological, and hydrographic information. Daily Bering Sea activity and Arctic Ocean monitoring through shore-based and non-terrestrial AIS significantly contribute to an understanding of vessels operating within PACAREA's AOR. The USCG is conducting beta testing of a capability to fuse AIS and Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) data, which will enhance the picture of shipping in the Arctic. In 2015, the DHS opened the Arctic Domain Awareness Center (ADAC) at the University of Alaska Anchorage. The Center enhances DHS and USCG capacity to respond to and prepare for emergencies, as well as better understand the Arctic environment and its challenges.

KEY PERFORMANCE MEASURES:

- Promulgated Area Contingency Plans
- Identification and closing of oil spill contingency response gaps
- Improved MDA to include detection, identification, tracking, and dissemination
- Strengthened U.S. energy security
- Preservation of freedom of the seas
- Improved community sustainability and well-being
- Enhanced scientific research and monitoring
- Prevention of IUU fishing in Arctic high seas (>200 nautical miles)⁶³
- Increased unity of effort with DOD, state, and federal agencies

NEXT STEPS:

- Identify operational resource, facility, and telecommunication requirements to project national interests through presence. Collaborate with DOD, DHS, DOS, state, and industry interests to complement facility investments. Continue to work with PACAREA and district subject matter experts and USCG headquarters' program managers to develop Resource Proposals until Arctic operations are approved for on-budget funding.
- Enhance effectiveness and disciplined management of partnerships through assignment of relationship and engagement responsibilities.
- Serve as a catalyst for development of an ACGF and encourage the Forum to execute multilateral exercises and operations, implement a common network for information sharing, and establish a combined fusion and operations center.
- Achieve domain awareness that informs safe and effective projection of at sea and shore authorities.
- Enhance engagement and partnership with tribal communities to build confidence and trust, particularly with respect to resiliency, subsistence, and quality of life.
- Partner with the USN to develop DOD's Arctic capabilities and identify opportunities for DOD to participate in USCG Arctic operations and exercises.
- Collaborate with USCG headquarters to develop Arctic operational requirements for future icebreakers, NSCs, Offshore Patrol Cutters, the Arctic Operations Center, and aviation assets to include UAS.

TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME

*[B]uild, balance, and integrate the tools of U.S. power to combat transnational organized crime and related threats to our national security ... and urge our partners to do the same.*⁶⁴
(2011 Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime)

RISK ASSESSMENT:

Threat – TOC is an enduring threat to U.S. security and prosperity, as well as rules-based international order. TOC foments instability, violence, and corruption that erode the rule of law, economic vitality, and public safety. TOC’s nefarious reach extends to “main street USA,” where Mexican TOC affiliates operate in nearly every state and major city (see Figure 4). TOC networks have evolved to form a crime-terror-insurgency nexus, with illicit activities that span drug trafficking, terrorism, human smuggling, trafficking in persons, trafficking in weapons, piracy, environmental crime, intellectual property theft, cybercrime,⁶⁵ and IUU fishing. TOC networks are adaptable and exert their will over the political and geographic landscapes, weakening governance, enabling illicit economies, and eroding public integrity. In the Eastern Pacific, criminals routinely move South American cocaine to Central America and Mexico via maritime routes aboard pangas, go-fast boats, fishing vessels, commercial cargo ships, and self-propelled semi-submersible (SPSS) vessels. Bulk loads are then broken down and transited through Central America and Mexico to the United States and global markets. Criminal organizations that relied for decades on profits from cocaine and marijuana have increasingly diversified to other illicit products, such as methamphetamine and heroin. In the WCPO, IUU fishing is a leading TOC threat with indicators and warnings of expanding activity in drug and human trafficking, as well as other illicit markets. A potential threat exists for the criminal transfer of WMD material to terrorists or use of human smuggling networks as a means for terrorists to enter the United States.⁶⁶

Vulnerability – PACAREA’s vast AOR poses considerable operational challenges for presence, patrols, and MDA. Reduced USG surface and air asset availability, combined with resource gaps, have diminished offshore and coastal zone network attack presence in the Eastern Pacific. Actionable intelligence currently exists on about 90% of known maritime drug movements, although our finite resources limit our capability to act on only 20% of those cases.⁶⁷ Countries with weak governance and fragile economies are especially vulnerable to TOC’s destructive influence. Collaboration among governments is critical to overcome resource and budgetary constraints. Illicit networks exploit Mexico’s, as well as Central and South America’s, vast and difficult to monitor maritime borders and evade limited partner nation interdiction resources. Along our Northern border with Canada, traffickers exploit extensive waterways to avoid detection and transport contraband. Opportunity costs associated with increased offshore and coastal zone presence in the Eastern Pacific have limited the resources available to conduct network attack against IUU.

Consequence – TOC threatens security, prosperity, and public safety. Illicit drugs in the United States cost \$193 billion in crime, health, and lost productivity in 2007.⁶⁸ The United States has one of the highest drug-related mortality rates worldwide at 4.6 times the global average and, with over 40,000 drug-related deaths recorded in 2013, accounts for approximately one in five drug-related deaths globally.⁶⁹ According to the UN’s Global Study on Homicide 2013, the Western Hemisphere had six of the top 10 nations ranked by per capita homicide to include the Northern Triangle countries of Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala in the top five.⁷⁰ Citizens in these countries look to the United States for assistance, either as a partner in restoring stability and good governance or as a destination where they can escape violence and start new lives. Illegal human migration from Central America into the United States – including large numbers of unaccompanied children – increased significantly in recent years.⁷¹ Human smuggling, including by maritime means, is a lucrative criminal activity that exploits and endangers desperate people, reduces human capital in source countries, and levies a significant burden

on receiving nations. IUU fishing threatens global food security and regional socio-economic stability, as well as presents opportunity for avenues of increased and diversified TOC.

PACAREA APPROACH:

Capabilities – Disrupting and dismantling TOC requires network attack that is agile, targeted, and persistent in all domains: maritime, air, land, and cyber. PACAREA strengthens and leverages multinational intelligence and law enforcement networks to best position maritime air and surface assets within a unified effort to target and defeat TOC networks. The USCG’s trident of forces (MPF, SBF, and DSF) are critical components of overall interagency efforts to attack illicit trafficking networks. PACAREA delivers intelligence-driven, integrated force packages adapted to attack TOC operations and technological innovations. Offshore, major cutters – with embarked short-range response helicopters supported by long-range MPA – provide MDA and presence that enable coordinated multi-mission, interagency operations with the ability and authority to stop, board, search, and seize suspect vessels and crews. These integrated force packages provide ISR capabilities in all environmental conditions, and conduct interdiction operations that culminate in case prosecution, perpetuating the detect-monitor-target-interdict-prosecute cycle. ISR, joint interagency planning, operational coordination, and information sharing between partner nations are essential to focus patrols to successfully attack networks operating in PACAREA’s AOR. USCG LEDETs embarked in USN or allied vessels conduct interdiction operations. In the Continental United States (CONUS) coastal zone, cutters, shore-based boats, MPA, and helicopters detect, monitor, track, and deliver boarding teams to vessels of interest, particularly along the U.S. maritime border. DSF mobilize, deploy, and conduct maritime safety and security operations in synchronization with SBF and MPF.

Competencies – The 2014 USCG Western Hemisphere Strategy guides our efforts in TOC network attack with an offensive posture that leverages intelligence and projects persistent presence in the distant offshore and coastal zones, where illicit shipments are the largest and most vulnerable to disruption.⁷² PACAREA has extensive experience in collaborating with our network of federal, state, local, and international partner agencies and countries to attack TOC networks. Analyzing information gathered during USCG boardings identifies networks, cues future interagency disruption actions, aids prosecution, and strengthens our domestic and international partnerships. PACAREA coordinates and conducts joint operations with other DHS components, DOD, interagency and international partners in a unified, layered offense against border threats. USSOUTHCOM’s Operation Martillo, DHS’s SBA Campaign, and Operation Baja Tempestad are examples of ongoing joint attack initiatives. PACAREA provides persistent presence in the offshore and coastal zones, shares enhanced intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination, as well as leads international engagements supporting Operation Martillo, SBA, and Operation Baja Tempestad. For Operation Baja Tempestad, focused on the waters off of Southern California, non-compliant vessel use-of-force from our shore-based boats, in concert with ReCoM partners, is added to the fight.⁷³ PACAREA attacks IUU networks through Operation North Pacific Guard, as part of a robust and standing network comprised of Canada, China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea. Our TOC efforts are guided by national strategies and coordinated through the MOTR mechanism. The USCG’s 45 maritime bilateral counterdrug agreements and arrangements with partner nations, as delegated to PACAREA, include all or some of the following provisions: shiprider and boarding agreements; pursuit, entry, and over-flight of the territorial sea; and, operation center information exchange protocols.

KEY PERFORMANCE MEASURES:


- Reduced TOC violence and corruption with an associated improvement in prosperity, rule of law, and effective governance within partner nations to include increased TOC interdictions, arrests, prosecution, and sentencing of high value TOC targets

- Increased number of TOC networks identified and listed as U.S. Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) priority organization targets, and greater USCG participation in network attack with interagency partners, particularly coordinated attacks with SBA's JTF-W on those networks that span the land-maritime border
- Reduced TOC income from transshipment and sale of contraband; expanded targeting and seizure of TOC financial resources by the U.S. interagency
- Improved capability and response rate to cued intelligence
- Enhanced information sharing and operational coordination within the ReCoM
- Increased contraband removal rate per cutter Days Away From Home Port (DAFHP) and MPA hours flown
- Increased number and quality of Field Intelligence Reports (FIRs) from deployed units

NEXT STEPS:

- Shape USG unity of effort to secure the homeland. Increase collaboration with all vital interagency partners to identify, prioritize, target, and attack TOC networks, in support of the National Security Strategy, SBA, and USCG Western Hemisphere Strategy.
- Focus TSC and engagement with Mexico and Central and South America. Align with DOS, USNORTHCOM, USSOUTHCOM, and USPACOM, to promote regional prosperity by fostering maritime governance.
- Continue to support and enhance USCG Western Hemisphere Strategy with our trident of forces to target and disrupt TOC networks, sources of funding, and critical operating nodes.
- Implement modern, integrated intelligence, counter-intelligence, cyber, operational, and technological capabilities to keep pace with rapid changes in TOC networks' TTP to protect and defend our information, people, assets, and infrastructure.
- Identify operational resource and infrastructure requirements to project national interests. Collaborate with the DOD and other partner agencies to complement investments. Coordinate USCG sector, district, area and headquarters' programmatic efforts to develop on-budget Resource Proposals.
- Pursue avenues to focus and integrate U.S. power through increased interoperability across the whole of government to include interoperability with USN assets as force multipliers to support USCG missions. Increase USCG personnel within Tactical Analysis Teams (TATs) and collaborate with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) efforts in Mexico and Central and South America.
- Inform and shape requirements for future maritime aviation capabilities, such as cutter-deployable, rotary wing aircraft. Establish a West Coast Deployment Center to include AUF capable aircraft. Employ UAS aboard flight deck equipped cutters.

Figure 4. Mexican TOC presence in the United States*



*Source: U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency. 2015 National Drug Threat Assessment Summary. p. 2. <http://www.dea.gov/docs/2015%20NDA%20Report.pdf>

COMPLEX CONTINGENCY RESPONSE

*A homeland that is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards where American interests, aspirations, and way of life can thrive.*⁷⁴ (2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review)

RISK ASSESSMENT:

Threat – A broad range of natural disasters (i.e., earthquakes, tsunamis, tropical cyclones, floods, volcanoes, and high surf) threaten the PACAREA AOR that could lead to significant loss of life and property, disruption of the global supply chain, and constrained freedom of navigation, requiring a CCR. A “Ring of Fire” encircles the Pacific, in which 90% of the world’s earthquakes occur.⁷⁵ Significant natural disasters are occurring globally with greater frequency. 2015 was a record year for Pacific hurricanes with increased widespread destruction and associated human and economic suffering. In addition to the hazards posed by natural disaster, the potential for adversaries to take advantage of a catastrophe and frustrate response operations through kinetic or cyber attacks on key targets, such as vital infrastructure, response resources, information system, and communications, cannot be discounted.

Vulnerability – The confluence of the PACAREA AOR’s vast geographic expanse, powerful weather systems, and natural disasters, combined with increasing levels of commercial and recreational vessel traffic, makes loss of life and property damage an ever-present and growing danger. Coastal population growth, sprawling urban development and increasingly complex maritime systems will place coastal CIKR and human populations increasingly at risk from disasters. Increased ocean use will raise the probability of hazardous material and oil spills. Substantial oil and gas reserves will drive exploitation initiatives in the Arctic, one of the world’s most pristine environments, in which the long-term impact of a major spill is unknown. Off-the-shelf technology does not exist to remove oil from ice. The U.S. Energy Renaissance and substantial increase in carriage of unconventional petroleum products with properties that cause them to disperse or sink in the water column, such as diluted bitumen, threaten the efficacy of our typical response procedures that handle crises on the surface.

Consequence – Disasters caused by natural hazards in Asia-Pacific resulted in an annual average of approximately \$70 billion in economic damages and 145 million people affected during 2004-2013.⁷⁶ In 2015, there were 10 weather and climate disaster events with losses exceeding \$1 billion each across the United States.⁷⁷ The 1980–2015 annual average in the United States was 5.2 events; the annual average for the most recent five years (2011–2015) was 10.8 events.⁷⁸ Eight PINs are among the world’s top 20 countries with the highest annual losses, on average, from disasters as a proportion of GDP.⁷⁹

PACAREA APPROACH:

Capabilities – PACAREA’s mix of cutters, aircraft, boats, and C4ISR systems enable its skilled workforce to form adaptive force packages that are able to be vectored to a specific geographic area to assist in response and recovery efforts. The USCG’s National Response Center maintains a 24/7 telephone watch and relays reports of pollution entered into the Incident Reporting Information System to the FOSC. Rescue 21, Automated Mutual-Assistance Vessel Rescue (AMVER), AIS, and Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacons (EPIRBs) are used for SAR operations. The USCG uses the DHS’s Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) to coordinate response efforts with federal, state, local, and private sector partners. PACAREA is also prepared to operate in degraded environments with reduction in capabilities to include compromise of C4ISR systems. The USCG’s National Strike Force is trained and equipped to respond to major marine pollution incidents to minimize damage and environmental consequences, including CBRNE incidents. During surge or extended response operations, qualified USCG personnel from the active duty, reserve component, volunteer auxiliary, and civilian workforce

quickly deploy to the operational areas.⁸⁰ PACAREA will leverage partnerships with the DHS and DOD when facing cyber-related challenges during contingency responses.

Competencies – When natural and man-made disasters occur, PACAREA forces respond rapidly and effectively to protect the Nation, mitigate the incident, minimize impacts, and facilitate recovery. (PACAREA forces will typically redeploy when a disaster shifts from the response phase to the recovery phase.) This engrained culture, combined with expert knowledge and proficiency in the national ICS, uniquely positions PACAREA to lead a wide range of maritime responses. PACAREA actively plans for surge operations through development of standardized and integrated Incident Response Plans and Incident Management Plans in support of the National Incident Management System (NIMS). PACAREA ensures effective and integrated mission support during contingency operations that enable DHS to meet NRF requirements. PACAREA could be requested to support the NRF’s ESFs to include Transportation (ESF 1), Information and Planning (ESF 5), Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing, and Human Services (ESF 6), SAR (ESF 9), Oil and Hazardous Materials Response (ESF 10), Public Safety and Security (ESF 13), and External Affairs (ESF 15). If a Spill of National Significance (SONS) is designated, the USCG may designate a National Incident Commander (NIC), pursuant to NCP, which will assume the role of the On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) in communicating with affected parties and the public, and coordinating federal, state, local, and international resources at the national level.⁸¹

KEY PERFORMANCE MEASURES:

- Expanded knowledge of emergency management through ICS training at all levels
- Updated, coordinated, and approved response plans within PACAREA and with stakeholders
- Completed standup of required Incident Management Teams (IMTs)
- Enhanced information sharing and situational awareness to develop a Common Operating Picture
- Provided resource coordination and prioritization to support districts and field units
- Conducted exercise and evaluation of plans in coordination with key partners (whole-of-government response)

NEXT STEPS:

- Enhance worldwide deployable force multipliers by optimizing emergency management training and assignment of emergency management teams at area, district, and sector level.
- Exercise all PACAREA contingency response plans and use the resulting data to set an optimized future planning cycle to be published.
- Identify and define needed relationships based on current and proposed contingency responses and plans. Then, bolster these internal and external partnerships to develop, plan, and carry out a national level CCR exercise.
- Identify and develop a PACAREA Instruction to ensure all involved share information through secure and open systems, produce relevant and standardized analytical products, and share information in a timely manner with appropriate PACAREA partners.
- In collaboration with the USCG’s headquarters and Atlantic Area, develop and formalize USCG CCR Preparedness Measurement System.
- Through external partnerships, identify and develop procedures, memorandums of understanding, and mutual aid agreements to allow for rapid coordination and deployment of resources across jurisdictional boundaries during CCR.
- Develop and conduct IMT training to educate members on the various processes for resource request prior to, during, and after a CCR.
- Establish a PACAREA Cyber Advisory Working Group to inform, advise, shape, and improve PACAREA’s preparedness toward all cyber threats through policy and plan development, training enhancements, cyber-focused exercises, and the implementation of best practices.

DEFENSE OPERATIONS

[T]he Coast Guard exists to defend and preserve the United States as a free nation. We protect important national interests — the personal safety and security of the people; our Nation’s territorial integrity; its natural and economic resources; critical infrastructure; and, the U.S. Marine Transportation System (MTS) — from all threats, internal and external, natural and man-made.⁸²

(2014 Coast Guard Publication 1: Doctrine for the U.S. Coast Guard)

RISK ASSESSMENT:

Threat – The threat of catastrophic attacks against our homeland by terrorists has diminished but still persists. Our adversaries are not confined to a distinct country or region. They include globally oriented groups like al-Qaeda and its affiliates, as well as a growing number of regionally focused and globally connected groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which could pose a threat to the homeland. No threat poses as grave a danger to our security and well-being as the potential use of WMD by states or terrorists.⁸³ Adversaries take advantage of technology and employ it to move money, communicate with cells in their organizations, approve missions, or conduct ISR missions on potential targets.⁸⁴ Terrorists or nation-states might attempt cyber attacks to disrupt critical information networks or information systems that are integral to the operation of the MTS and commerce system.⁸⁵

Vulnerability – The maritime domain serves as a vast and ungoverned medium for an array of threats – conventional attacks or the use of WMD.⁸⁶ The vast number of commercial and private vessels, coupled with the inherent difficulty of determining their specific intent, makes detection and monitoring of potential threats difficult. The infrastructure and systems that span the maritime domain, owned largely by the private sector, are both targets of and potential conveyances for dangerous and illicit activities.⁸⁷

Consequence – The CIKR of the maritime domain constitute a vital part of the complex systems necessary for economic and national security.⁸⁸ Beyond the immediate casualties, the consequences of an attack on one node of a critical infrastructure may include disruption of entire systems, significant damage to the economy, or the inability to project military forces.⁸⁹ The United States depends on networks of critical infrastructure – both physical networks such as the MTS and cyber networks such as interlinked computer operations systems.⁹⁰ Adversaries have the potential to cause serious damage to global, political, and economic security.

PACAREA APPROACH:

Capabilities – In the offshore zone, major cutters have the required endurance to provide presence far at sea, where they monitor and patrol the EEZs and maintain maximum readiness to rapidly respond to threats as far from the homeland as possible.⁹¹ As U.S. warships, major cutters are armed with multiple weapons systems, carry small boats, and deploy armed law enforcement boarding teams. USCGCs are sovereign naval warships that enjoy the right of approach and the right of visit over foreign vessels encountered in international waters. Major cutters have the capability to detect, interdict, stop, and board other vessels. The NSC is designed to operate in contaminated CBRNE environments. USCG LEDETs embarked in USN or allied vessels conduct enforcement activities, including visit, boarding, search, and seizure. Long-range surveillance aircraft provide MDA and presence in the offshore domain. Major cutters frequently embark a medium-range or short-range response aircraft to increase ISR and interdiction capabilities. Helicopters may carry, deploy, and recover armed boarding teams (e.g., Maritime Security Response Team, Maritime Safety and Security Team, or LEDET forces) through vertical insertion or vertical delivery to board a ship.⁹²

Consistent with the *National Fleet Policy*, USCG forces must be able to operate as part of a joint task force thousands of miles from our shores.⁹³ PACAREA forces are capable and equipped to deploy and conduct joint operations in support of DOD's GCCs to include port security and harbor defense, TSC, coastal sea control operations, rotary-wing air intercept operations, combating terrorism operations, military environmental response, and MOTR support. PACAREA participates in exercises that focus on maritime interoperability and capability of U.S., Canadian, and Mexican forces to respond to a mutual maritime security threat in support of NAMSII. Eight PSUs support GCCs by providing expeditionary port security and harbor defense capability. A PACAREA unit at USPACOM supports GCC planning and regional security efforts, per the 2011 PACAREA-USPACOM MOA.

In the coastal and inshore zones, USCG patrol boats are deployed and continuously conduct patrols in areas of known or suspected threats, as informed by intelligence, planning, and command and control.⁹⁴ Boat stations maintain high states of readiness and immediately launch motor lifeboats, response boats, or special purpose craft to respond to threats, incidents, reports of mariners in distress, or to conduct other operations.⁹⁵ Patrol boats and boats launched from boat stations can detect, interdict, stop, and board other vessels, and employ a range of TTP and levels of force depending on the severity of the threat including, when necessary and appropriate, employment of warning fire, disabling fire, and destructive fire.⁹⁶ Long-range and medium-range surveillance aircraft and medium-range and short-range response helicopters conduct similar operations as in the offshore operational area.⁹⁷ As a member of the IC, USCG and PACAREA share as active participants in DOD and associated intelligence networks.

Competencies – PACAREA relies on DOD plans, MOTR Plan and Protocols, NRF, and ICS to synchronize unity of effort among federal, state, tribal, and local agencies and organizations, as well as allies and partners, to respond to maritime threats and incidents.⁹⁸ Based on experience with MOTR Plan and Protocols addressing response to maritime threats, USCG forces are more likely to be the first U.S. forces on scene with the authority and capability to respond.⁹⁹ PACAREA scales response activities based on the concept of Maritime Terrorism Threat Space, which describes the risk or consequence of the terrorist threat and the complexity of the SNMR necessary to mitigate that threat.¹⁰⁰ The threat spectrum ranges from the relatively low-risk individual with ties to terrorist groups seeking to gain entrance to the United States; to vessel cargo that may contain weapons or components of weapons intended for terrorist use; to the highest risk threat, including hijacking of fully laden passenger vessels or maritime transport of WMD.¹⁰¹

In the 2004 MHD MOA, the USN and USCG agreed to command and control protocols to facilitate the rapid deployment of forces in a maritime defense scenario. In those situations, PACAREA's Commander serves separately as CG DEFORWEST. CG DEFORWEST reports to U.S. Navy North (NAVNORTH) for missions within the USNORTHCOM AOR and separately to CPF for missions within the USPACOM AOR. CG DEFORWEST continuously exists within the DOD chain of command per Title 10 and Title 14 authorities and, upon declaration of a MHD mission, forces will be assigned to CG DEFORWEST by PACAREA and/or by DOD. PACAREA has a deliberate role in USPACOM's planning process and CG DEFORWEST has a significant role in USPACOM's contingency and theater campaign plans.

A 2008 agreement between the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security formalized the use of USCG competencies and resources in support of the National Military Strategy and DOD operations to include port operations, security, and defense, as well as MOTR support. USCG personnel are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, deployable worldwide, and can be directed to safeguard the homeland. USCG personnel and units receive DOD training in command and control, flight operations, shipboard damage control, mechanical repairs for equipment, and weapons operation and maintenance. The USCG resides within the DHS and only transfers to the Department of the Navy upon declaration of

war or when the President so directs. The USCG is therefore required to maintain a state of readiness to function as a specialized service within the USN in time of war.

PACAREA shapes a peaceful and stable maritime governance regime in its AOR, consistent with foundational principles and objectives identified in the: A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower to include defending the homeland, deterring conflict, responding to crisis, defeating aggression, protecting the maritime commons, strengthening partnerships, and providing HA/DR, as well as recognizing that naval forces are stronger when operated jointly and with allies and partners;¹⁰² and, National Strategy for Maritime Security to include preventing terrorist attacks and criminal or hostile acts, protecting maritime-related population centers and critical infrastructures, minimizing damage and expediting recovery, and safeguarding the ocean and its resources.¹⁰³

KEY PERFORMANCE MEASURES:

- Support DOD campaign plans by ensuring: readiness of pre-designated PACAREA forces and support commands; updated and properly sequenced Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD); and, consistency with USCG priorities and DOD/DHS MOA capabilities
- Strengthen service interoperability and partnerships through: Flag and senior officer engagement; Staff/Command Center peer collaboration; and, staff coordination between critical DOD and USCG operational commands through USCG Liaison Officer and USN MHD Detachments
- Alignment of PACAREA's international engagements with DOD's TSC plan, and update the Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (TSCMIS)

NEXT STEPS:

- Establish process to periodically review, revise, and prioritize PACAREA's supporting/supported roles and responsibilities within plans, policies, and orders (e.g., OPLANS, MOAs, Execute Orders, Global Force Management Implementation Guidance).
- Build upon PACAREA's intelligence enterprise with internal and external partners: improve information sharing, aviation and border security, and international cooperation; improve cyber and ISR capabilities; maintain information sharing with Canada and expand sharing activity with Australia and New Zealand through professional exchanges; maintain MIFC-PAC Liaison Officer presence in Japan and CPF (N2 Intelligence Division); and, maintain information sharing with partner nations in support of OMSI.
- Develop a multi-year training, exercise, and engagement plan with defined objectives that address defense readiness, service commitments, and key partnerships.
- Evaluate force allocation, employment schedules, and logistical support with DOD partners mitigating gaps, seams, and redundancies (C3F, C7F, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, CPF, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, USNORTHCOM, USPACOM).
- Formalize PACAREA's defense readiness metrics in support of DOD campaign plans.

ACRONYMS

| | |
|--------------|--|
| ACGF | Arctic Coast Guard Forum |
| ACOGATT | Assistant U.S. Coast Guard Attaché |
| ADAC | Arctic Domain Awareness Center |
| AIS | Automatic Identification System |
| AOR | Area of Responsibility |
| AMS | Area Maritime Security |
| AMSC | Area Maritime Security Committee |
| AMVER | Automated Mutual-Assistance Vessel Rescue |
| ANOA | Advanced Notice of Arrival |
| ATON | Aids to Navigation |
| ATS | Automated Targeting System |
| AUF | Airborne Use of Force |
| BBL/D | Barrels Per Day |
| C3F | U.S. Third Fleet |
| C4ISR | Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance |
| C7F | U.S. Seventh Fleet |
| CART | Common Assessment and Reporting Tool |
| CBP | U.S. Customs and Border Protection |
| CBRNE | Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive |
| CCR | Complex Contingency Response |
| CG DEFORWEST | Commander, Defense Force West |
| CGLO | U.S. Coast Guard Liaison Officers |
| CIKR | Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources |
| COFA | Compact of Free Association |
| COGATT | U.S. Coast Guard Attaché |
| CONUS | Continental United States |
| COTP | Captain of the Port |
| CPF | U.S. Pacific Fleet |
| DAFHP | Days Away From Home Port |
| DATT | Defense Attaché |
| DEA | U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration |
| DHS | U.S. Department of Homeland Security |
| DOD | U.S. Department of Defense |
| DOE | U.S. Department of Energy |
| DOI | U.S. Department of the Interior |
| DOJ | U.S. Department of Justice |
| DOS | U.S. Department of State |
| DOT | U.S. Department of Transportation |
| DRAT | District Response Advisory Teams |
| DSF | Deployable Specialized Forces |
| EEZ | Exclusive Economic Zone |
| EPA | U.S. Environmental Protection Agency |
| EPIRB | Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon |
| ESF | Emergency Support Function |
| FEACT | Activities Far East |
| FEMA | Federal Emergency Management Agency |

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| FFA | Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency |
| FIR | Field Intelligence Report |
| FMSC | Federal Maritime Security Coordinator |
| FOL | Forward Operating Location |
| FOSC | Federal On-Scene Coordinator |
| FY | Fiscal Year |
| GCC | Geographic Combatant Commander |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| HA/DR | Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief |
| HSDN | High Seas Drift Net |
| HSI | Homeland Security Investigations |
| HSIN | Homeland Security Information Network |
| IC | U.S. Intelligence Community |
| ICC | U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center |
| ICE | U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement |
| ICMLEO | Integrated Cross-Border Maritime Law Enforcement Operations |
| ICS | Incident Command System |
| ILWU | International Longshore and Warehouse Union |
| IMO | International Maritime Organization |
| IMT | Incident Management Team |
| IPS | International Port Security |
| IPSLO | International Port Security Liaison Officer |
| ISIL | Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant |
| ISPS | International Ship and Port Facility Security |
| ISR | Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance |
| IUU | Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated |
| IWG | Interagency Working Group |
| JIATF | Joint Interagency Task Force |
| JTF-W | Joint Task Force West |
| LEDET | Law Enforcement Detachment |
| LRIT | Long Range Identification and Tracking |
| MARPAC | Canadian Maritime Forces Pacific |
| MARPOL | Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships |
| MARSEC | Maritime Security |
| MBL | Maritime Boundary Line |
| MDA | Maritime Domain Awareness |
| MHD | Maritime Homeland Defense |
| MIDET | Marine Inspection Detachment |
| MIFC-PAC | Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center-Pacific |
| MISLE | Marine Information for Safety and Law Enforcement |
| MOA | Memorandum of Agreement |
| MODU | Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit |
| MOTR | Maritime Operational Threat Response |
| MPA | Maritime Patrol Aircraft |
| MPF | Maritime Patrol Forces |
| MSRAM | Maritime Security Risk Assessment Model |
| MSRO | Maritime Security and Response Operations |
| MTS | U.S. Marine Transportation System |
| MTSA | Maritime Transportation Security Act |
| NAMSI | North American Maritime Security Initiative |
| NASA | National Aeronautics and Space Administration |

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| NAVNORTH | U.S. Navy North |
| NCP | National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan |
| NIC | National Incident Commander |
| NIMS | National Incident Management System |
| NMFS | National Marine Fisheries Service |
| NMIC | National Maritime Intelligence Center |
| NOAA | National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration |
| NPAFC | North Pacific Anadromous Fisheries Commission |
| NPCGF | North Pacific Coast Guard Forum |
| NPFMC | North Pacific Fisheries Management Council |
| NRF | National Response Framework |
| NRT | National Response Team |
| NSC | National Security Cutter |
| NSF | National Science Foundation |
| NTAS | National Terrorism Advisory System |
| NTC | National Targeting Center |
| NVMC | National Vessel Movement Center |
| OCDETF | U.S. Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force |
| OCMI | Officer-in-Charge of Marine Inspection |
| OCS | Outer Continental Shelf |
| ODC | Office of Defense Cooperation |
| OMSI | Oceania Maritime Security Initiative |
| OPA 90 | Oil Pollution Act of 1990 |
| OPLAN | Operation Plan |
| OSC | On-Scene Coordinator |
| PACAREA | U.S. Coast Guard Pacific Area |
| PARS | Port Access Route Studies |
| PDD | Presidential Decision Directive |
| PIN | Pacific Island Nation |
| PMA | Pacific Maritime Association |
| PPA | Principal Planning Agent |
| PSI | Proliferation Security Initiative |
| PSU | Port Security Unit |
| QHSR | Quadrennial Homeland Security Review |
| RCMP | Royal Canadian Mounted Police |
| ReCAAP | Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia |
| ReCoM | Regional Coordinating Mechanism |
| SAA | Security Assistance Advisor |
| SANS | Ship Arrival Notification System |
| SAR | Search and Rescue |
| SAROPS | Search and Rescue Optimal Planning System |
| SBA | Southern Border and Approaches |
| SBF | Shore-Based Forces |
| SCADA | Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition |
| SDO | Senior Defense Official |
| SEMAR | Mexican Navy |
| SIP | Support to Interdiction and Prosecution Team |
| SNMR | Short Notice Maritime Response |
| SOLAS | Safety of Life at Sea |
| SONS | Spill of National Significance |

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| SORS | Spilled Oil Recovery System |
| SPRFMO | South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organization |
| SPSS | Self-Propelled Semi-Submersible Vessel |
| TACON | Tactical Control |
| TAT | Tactical Analysis Team |
| TLO | Tribal Liaison Officer |
| TOC | Transnational Organized Crime |
| TPFDD | Time-Phased Force Deployment Data |
| TSC | Theater Security Cooperation |
| TSCMIS | Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System |
| TTP | Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures |
| UAS | Unmanned Aerial Systems |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNCLOS | UN Convention on the Law of the Sea |
| USC | U.S. Code |
| USCG | U.S. Coast Guard |
| USCGC | U.S. Coast Guard Cutter |
| USG | U.S. Government |
| USN | U.S. Navy |
| USNORTHCOM | U.S. Northern Command |
| USPACOM | U.S. Pacific Command |
| USSOUTHCOM | U.S. Southern Command |
| VMS | Vessel Monitoring Systems |
| VOSS | Vessel of Opportunity Skimming System |
| VTS | Vessel Traffic Service |
| WAMS | Waterways Analysis and Management Studies |
| WCPO | Western and Central Pacific Ocean |
| WCPFC | Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission |
| WMD | Weapons of Mass Destruction |

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